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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  recent  introduction  by  the  central  government  of  recovery  plans  (RPs)  for  Italian  hospi-
tals provides  useful  insights  into  the  recentralization  tendencies  that  are  being  experienced
within  the  country’s  decentralized,  regional  health  system.  The  measure  also contributes
evidence  to the  debate  on whether  there  is a  long-term  structural  shift  in national  health
strategy  towards  more  centralized  stewardship.  The hospital  RPs  aim  to  improve  the
clinical,  ﬁnancial  and  managerial  performance  of  public-hospitals,  teaching-hospitals  and
research-hospitals  through  monitoring  trends  in  individual  hospitals’  expenditure  and
tackling improvements  in  clinical  care.  As  such  they  represent  the  central  governments
recognition  of the  weaknesses  of  the decentralization  process  in  the  health  sector.  The
opponents  of the  reform  argue  that  ﬁnancial  stability  will  be  restored  mainly  through
across-the-board  reductions  in hospital  expenditure,  personnel  layoffs  and  closing  of wards,
with  considerable  negative  effects  on the  most  vulnerable  groups  of patients.  While  hospi-
tal RPs  are  comprehensive  and  complex,  unresolved  issues  remain  as to whether  hospitals
have  the  necessary  managerial  skills  for the  development  of  effective  and achievable  plans.
Without  also  devising  an overall  plan to tackle  the  long-standing  managerial  weaknesses
of  public  hospitals,  the  objectives  of the hospital  RPs  will  be  undermined  and  the decen-
tralization  process  in the  health  system  will  gradually  reach  a  dead-end.
©  2017  The  Author(s).  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an open  access  article
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1. Introduction
Over the past 40 years, in both developed and develop-
ing countries, health system organization has undergone a
decentralization process from the national to regional and
local levels, introducing a multi-level governance structure
[1–5]. The main aims of the devolution reforms have been
two-fold: to increase efﬁciency and to improve the ﬁnan-
cial responsiveness of decentralized authorities [2,6,7].
However, during the early years of the 21st century, a
re-centralization process in European health systems has
been observed, even if this trend has been limited only to
certain functions speciﬁcally related to political and ﬁscal
competences, while legislative powers over health sys-

























































tM. Mauro et al. / Heal
em organization have remained at the regional level. The
doption of these measures has mainly been due to pol-
cymakers’ concerns about the ﬁnancial sustainability of
ealthcare systems, equity problems relating to popula-
ion health outcomes and accessibility to services, and wide
nterregional differences resulting from devolution poli-
ies [5,8–12]. This re-centralization process has favoured
he diffusion of theories on the reversal of decentraliza-
ion trends, with some authors claiming that the “new long
ave of re-centralization” is a long-term structural shift
n national health strategy [5]. Conversely, other authors
ave identiﬁed in these policies only an attempt by poli-
ymakers to rapidly cut costs (consistent with EU austerity
onditionalities), thus merely representing the adoption of
 stronger stewardship approach in the management of
ighly decentralized health sectors [11,13].
The recent experiences of the Italian National Health
ervice (INHS) may  provide useful evidence for the debate
n the decentralization of healthcare. We  describe the con-
ext of a new reform measure by the central government
hat introduces hospital recovery plans and discuss the
xpected beneﬁts and potential issues that arise in their
mplementation. We also consider the arguments that have
een advanced by proponents and opponents of the reform.
he results may  be useful to policymakers in considering
he transferability of the approach to other countries.
. Background
In Italy, the process of devolving healthcare from the
entral government to the regions began in 2001 with the
ransfer of major ﬁscal, ﬁnancial and managerial responsi-
ilities to the regional level, which was already responsible
or the delivery of healthcare [14]. This process produced
ixed results. Some regions implemented all the actions
hat they were capable of executing to meet the broad
bjectives of the reform, thus strengthening their systems.
n contrast, regions that had weak managerial capacity and
ower health service performance failed to reach the set
oals [13,15–17]. A major consequence of the decentral-
zation process to date is a signiﬁcant imbalance in health
xpenditure levels among regions, resulting in consider-
ble health budget deﬁcits in 10 out of the 21 regional
ealth systems. Since 2006, a re-centralization process
as been underway, with a special focus on the weakest
egions. Speciﬁcally, the central government has obliged
hose regions to adopt regional recovery plans (RRPs) with
he aim of reducing healthcare expenditures in their own
ublic spending. In the worst cases, the national govern-
ent has appointed a Commissioner to pursue the central
overnment’s targets [9,13,15–17]. The overall effect of this
egime has been a decrease in the annual level of over-
pending. Indeed, in 2014, the public sector’s total deﬁcit
as D 864 billion, an 85% decline since 2006 (D 6.010 bil-
ion) [18,19]. This decline suggests that RRPs are effective
ools for improving economic and ﬁnancial performance
n the short term [9,13,16,18–20] with some limitations.
ndeed, several authors have observed i) RRPs’ limited efﬁ-
acy in solving the structural causes of the deﬁcits and ii)
he lower quality of health prevention projects developed 121 (2017) 582–587 583
in Italian regions with ﬁnancial deﬁcits and recovery plans
[9,16,21].
In light of the RRPs’ positive results, in terms of both
health system efﬁciency improvement and deﬁcit reduc-
tion, and the Italian government’s need to rebalance its
ﬁnances, the Ministry of Health introduced hospital recov-
ery plans in 2015 (Law No. 208/2015 art. 1 paragraphs
524–526) [22]. This article reports on these new ﬁnancial
instruments for Italian hospitals, which is the country’s ﬁrst
experience of compulsory recovery plans for hospitals.
3. The new decree
3.1. The purpose and the content of the reform
Law No. 208/2015 introduced recovery plans for hos-
pitals [22], with the draft decree being sent to the
State-Regions Conference, Italy’s inter-governmental body
regulating the relations between the central government
and the regions, in February 2016. This draft contained
guidelines for improving the clinical, economic, ﬁnancial
and managerial performance of public hospitals (known
as Aziende Ospedaliere, AO), teaching hospitals (Aziende
Ospedaliere Universitarie, AOU) and research hospitals (Isti-
tuti di ricovero e cura a carattere scientiﬁcio,  IRCCS) [23].
The endorsed decree, which was  originally scheduled to
be enacted in March 2016, was enforced in July 2016 [24].
Speciﬁcally, the new decree outlines the operational
tools (recovery plans) for a) monitoring trends in individ-
ual hospitals’ healthcare expenditure and b) implementing
vigorous and effective interventions to improve the care
provided and to ensure that all hospitals provide at a
minimum, the services outlined in the “Essential Levels
of Care” (LEAs), the basic beneﬁts package that must be
provided uniformly across the country. The main aim of
this approach is to provide an effective tool for hospitals
that is consistent with the growing demand for health ser-
vices induced by demographic trends and epidemiological
tendencies. The decree regulates two  different types of
recovery plans, both of which have a three-year horizon:
Type A and Type B [23]. Type A plans deal with efﬁciency
and are designed to ensure that hospitals develop strate-
gies to balance their budgets. They apply to hospitals where
the difference between costs that are recognized in the
income statement and income that comes from health-
care “is greater than or equal to 5% or, in absolute terms,
at least D 10 (or 8) million”. Type B plans relate to clini-
cal care and aim to identify measures that may  improve
care. They apply to hospitals that do not comply with the
parameters concerning volume, quality and outcomes of
care established by the central government. To draft the
plans, hospitals must undertake several activities, as sum-
marized in Table 1.
Each region must identify the health organizations
within its jurisdiction that meet the above criteria and
therefore are required to draft either one or both of the
recovery plans. Each of the identiﬁed organizations has
ninety days to present its three-year plan in accordance
with the decree. The region must ensure that the actions
outlined in the plan are implemented [23].
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Table 1
The Content of Recovery Plans.
A − Efﬁciency Recovery Plan B − Clinical Care Recovery Plan
Sections
Section 1
Analyse the economic and ﬁnancial situation over the past three years in
order to identify the causes that led to the deﬁcit.
Section 1
Verify and evaluate the quality of data upon which the compulsory
drafting plan is based.
Section 2
Deﬁne the goals, interventions and actions of the plan by outlining drivers
to  improve efﬁciency. The decree does not deﬁne the objectives or
indicators. It provides only a few areas of focus (as examples) for change:
•  Adjusting the size of operating units;
•  Optimizing the type and amount of care provided by assessing the
appropriateness of services;
•  Controlling the quantity and/or price of production factors, (eg.
rationalizing stafﬁng levels).
Section 2
Analyse the situation through clinical and organizational audits regarding:
•  An analysis of services;
• The deﬁnition of the audit methodology;
• Veriﬁcation of the differences between clinical practice and
international medical standards;
• Variance analysis, focusing on the cause;
•  The deﬁnition of indicators for monitoring and regulating clinical
practices in order to ensure adherence to international standards.
Section 3
Draft an income statement that shows current trends, actions and the
effect of such actions on current trends. This is a new instrument
introduced by the decree, which has the potential to be a useful
programming and management instrument.
Section 3
Deﬁne actions to resolve critical issues identiﬁed during the previous
phase; synthesize these in a matrix that links remedial measures,






instrDeﬁne quantitative and qualitative indicators for monitoring the action
and verifying the results.
Source: Extracted from Law No. 208/2015 art. 1 paragraphs 524–526.
3.2. The stakeholder positions
The new decree will directly or indirectly involve a
plurality of stakeholders, such as regional governments,
hospital managers, personnel and citizens/patients [25]. In
Fig. 1, we summarize stakeholders’ inﬂuence in the policy
process and their support or opposition to the introduction
of hospital recovery plans.
Most regional governors, with some exceptions, and
hospital managers supported the implementation of hos-
pital recovery plans as opportunities to reduce regional
ﬁnancial deﬁcits and to improve health system organiza-
tion and the care provided by health organizations [26,27].
The main opposition came from trade union represen-
tatives and several workforce and patient associations,
which feared that the adoption of these measures could
lead to linear spending cuts, personnel layoffs and the
closing/reorganization of wards, with considerable neg-
ative effects on the most vulnerable groups of patients
[27]. Consequently, they demanded that they be involved
in all phases of the reform process but no opportunity
to participate in the planning or implementation of the
hospital recovery plans was extended to such groups.
Notably, regional governments and hospital managers had
a moderate inﬂuence on the policy process, but they are
currently involved in the implementation process [28].
Indeed, before the decree entered into force, central gov-
ernment representatives, a delegation from the Italian
Federation of Health Organizations and Hospitals (FIASO)
and regional governors discussed the planning of interven-
tions that would form the basis of future hospital recovery
plans. In contrast, front-line medical personnel had a weak
inﬂuence on the policy process and are barely involved
in the implementation of recovery plans. Finally, although
public opinion is important, patients/citizens had a weak
inﬂuence on the process.ne instruments to monitor the implementation of the plan. In this case
uments refer to periodic reports.
4. The expected outcomes and potential limitations
of the reform
The decree will target improvement in both hospitals’
operational efﬁciency, their performance in terms of the
health services they provide, and the quality of care. Esti-
mates indicate that this decree will affect approximately
49% of Italian public hospitals; altogether, these organiza-
tions have a deﬁcit of approximately D 1.8 billion (Table 2).
Among all the measures that will be introduced, reducing
hospital deﬁcits will result in estimated savings of more
than D 1.4 billion over three years, which represents 80% of
the total deﬁcit [29].
To reduce hospitals’ deﬁcits, the central government has
planned several measures for implementation [23]. The fol-
lowing are expected to produce the greatest impact:
• the reorganization of hospital wards through the closure
of organizational units that do not have at least 15 hos-
pital beds, in order to incentivize economies of scale and
technical efﬁciency; and
• the rationalization of human resources and medical tech-
nologies in the health system.
The latter goals involve extending the opening hours
of operating rooms, surgeries and facilities providing diag-
nostic services; planning personnel needs for each health
organization; and identifying excess stafﬁng, which deter-
mine turn-over and mobility of personnel. Overall, the
measures imply cuts in the cost of personnel but the way
in which each hospital will opt to reach its targets is not
yet known.Notably, despite the need to rationalize health expen-
diture and to both reduce deﬁcits and improve the quality
of care provided by hospitals, many unresolved issues
remain with regard to the deﬁcit-reducing reorganization
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Fig. 1. Stakeholders’ positions and their inﬂuence on the reform process.
Table 2
Hospital organizations required to implement Recovery Plans
Hospitals (including AO, AOU, IRCSS) − 2014






















Piedmont 6 1 0 0 1 183 036
Lombardy 35 4 1 0 5 141 222
Veneto  3 1 0 0 1 16 337
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 5 3 1 0 4 92 545
Liguria 2 1 0 1 2 137 895
Tuscany 4 2 1 0 3 71 953
Marche 3 0 2 0 2 NA
Lazio  9 3 1 2 6 282 660
Campania 10 3 3 4 10 309 081
Apulia  4 2 1 0 3 48 730
Basilicata 2 0 1 0 1 NA
Calabria 5 0 0 4 4 105 552
Sicily  9 5 0 3 8 340 250
















fTotal  108 27 11
A: Not Available.
ource:  Extracted from “QuotidianoSanità”; based on data from AGENAS.
easures developed by the central government. First, the
ecree does not address pre-existing managerial weak-
esses. In this context, hospitals’ General Managers are
esponsible for reducing deﬁcits but, as reported by several
ources, in the recent past many of them have been weak in
anagerial capacities and have been responsible for gener-
ting deﬁcits [8,9,11,17]. Moreover, preliminary analyses of
he ﬁnancial statements of the hospitals across the coun-
ry (results summarized in Table 2) have been based on
eterogeneous ﬁnancial reports, in which data reliability
nd comparability are not a foregone conclusion. Second,
he monitoring of regions’ and hospitals’ healthcare per-
ormance has highlighted a wide gap not only between15 53 1 841 499
regions but also between hospitals operating in the same
region, both of which are closely linked to weak adminis-
trative and management capacities [9,11,13,15–17]. Third,
a three-year programme does not demonstrate a long-
term view, evidencing the lack of strategic oversight and
planning across the health system [9,17,21]. Given these
considerations, it is clear that the healthcare system would
beneﬁt from a re-organization that pays greater attention
to long-term strategic reforms. To summarize, the recovery
plans for hospitals follow on from RRPs, thus representing
effective tools to reduce deﬁcits, even if doubts still remain
as to whether they will impact effectively on health system
performance in the long run.
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5. Discussion
The recent experience of the INHS clearly shows how the
initial decentralization process employed by the Ministry
of Health as a tool to help regions manage their own health
services has led back to a new re-centralization process in
Italy, similar to experiences in other decentralized coun-
tries [1–6]. RRPs can be seen as a major policy measure that
exempliﬁes the tendency towards renewed centralization
in Italy [30]. To date, the RRPs have represented the main
tool used by the central government to limit the damage
caused by devolution policies in terms of wide interre-
gional differences and major public debts [9,13,15–17],
with signiﬁcant success in reducing the deﬁcits of regional
governments [9,15–20]. This result implies that the con-
solidation and strengthened monitoring of costs and of the
quality of services provided across the country should con-
tinue in line with the policy actions that have been taken
in recent years.
The further introduction of hospital recovery plans rein-
forces the Ministry of Health’s stewardship role for regional
authorities [22–24]. In general, the structure of the hospital
recovery plans is comprehensive and complex, and focuses
on a number of operational problems and weaknesses.
However, as has been highlighted, many issues in the reor-
ganization process contained within the hospital recovery
plans, including ward restructuring, personnel deployment
and ﬁnancial management, remain unresolved. The main
doubts relate to whether hospitals have the managerial
skills that are necessary to develop effective and achiev-
able plans. This leads to a twofold risk. First, a lack of skills
can hinder the proper implementation of the health pol-
icy, increasing the risk that the three-year plans will be
achieved mainly through linear spending cuts. Second, as
previously noted, this situation affects many of the regions
that are already implementing broader RRPs and, thus,
unavoidably exacerbates the gap between regions in terms
of ﬁnancial performance. Finally, on a more positive note,
the decree’s creation of a homogeneous accountability
system among all hospitals, based on shared measure-
ment criteria of costs and revenues, should strengthen
the ability to develop effective and achievable recovery
plans.
Overall, we argue that the introduction of recovery
plans, ﬁrst for the regions and more recently speciﬁcally for
hospitals, represents the central government’s recognition
of a weakness in the decentralization process: the decree
directly affects those responsible for health budget deﬁcits
and for delivering health services. Several authors observe
that although the central government is increasing its role
in steering the INHS, the decentralized regional organiza-
tion of the health sector per se does not appear to be at risk
[5,11,13,17]. What is clear, however, is that the governance
of the entire multi-level Italian health system is crucial
for the effective management of policy changes. In our
view, if central government continues to deﬁne top-down
extraordinary measures, such as RRPs and hospital recov-
ery plans, without also devising an overall plan to tackle
the long-standing structural and managerial weaknesses
of hospital organizations, and without supporting regional
authorities through adequate funding, then decentraliza- 121 (2017) 582–587
tion in the health system will gradually reach a dead-end.
In order to strengthen regions’ capacities to achieve perfor-
mance and efﬁciency targets, the Ministry of Health should
focus greater effort on the accountability systems that are
adopted by public hospitals, ensuring the comparability
and reliability of the data in ﬁnancial reports, and providing
the means, ex-ante, for actors within the regional health
systems to develop adequate skills, tools, and competen-
cies. This will require more investment in the health system
rather than the adoption of linear cuts.
6. Conclusion
The Italian experience with RRPs and speciﬁcally with
hospital recovery plans reinforces the international evi-
dence that ﬁnancial prerogatives constitute a major driver
of re-centralization tendencies in regionalized health sys-
tems. But it also provides some insights to policy-makers
(both national and international) on the potential pit-
falls of top-down stewardship approaches to improving
budgetary and operational performance in decentralized
health systems. The objectives of the hospital recovery
plans are ambitious in that their ultimate aim is com-
pel regions to reduce or eliminate their health budget
deﬁcits through structural changes that will ultimately
improve efﬁciency. At the same time they aim to tackle
improvements in clinical care. In theory, these are sound
objectives that put in motion much needed and deeper
structural reforms in the hospital sector which may have
stalled in the past at regional level and can now gain
traction through an ‘external’ directive from the central
government. However, without also working with the
regions to invest in improving the weaknesses in manage-
rial capacity within hospitals, regions will likely resort to
short-term cost-containment measures to meet budgetary
targets rather than adequately focus on more fundamen-
tal improvements in efﬁciency and hospital performance.
Such investment requires funding, longer-term planning
and knowledge transfer initiatives within a broader frame-
work of regional co-operation than is currently promoted
within top-down planning instruments such as hospital
recovery plans.
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